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GONZALES V. CARHART AND THE HAZARDS 
OF MUDDLED SCRUTINY 
David D. Meyer* 
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,1 
upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, has 
incited both passion and puzzlement. The passions are readily 
understandable. The case was, after all, the new Roberts Court‘s 
first pass at what is commonly taken to be ―the most divisive issue 
in America.‖2 And the Court‘s five-to-four decision only 
magnified the drama by producing several additional ―firsts.‖ The 
Washington Post, for example, observed that, ―[f]or the first time 
since the court established a woman‘s right to an abortion in 1973, 
the justices said the Constitution permits a nationwide prohibition 
on a specific abortion method.‖3 Justice Ginsburg, in a blistering 
dissent which she read aloud from the bench, emphasized that ―for 
the first time since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no 
exception safeguarding a woman‘s health.‖4 
Advocates on both sides of the abortion question saw the 
decision as a turning point.
5
 Opponents of abortion hailed the 
                                                        
 *Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I am grateful to 
Mike Cahill, Marsha Garrison, Nan Hunter, Karen Porter, and the other 
participants at Brooklyn Law School‘s March 2008 symposium, The “Partial-
Birth Abortion” Ban: Health Care in the Shadow of Criminal Liability, as well 
as to the editors of the Journal of Law and Policy. 
1 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
2 JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 74 
(Penguin Group 2007). 
3 Mark Sherman, Justices Uphold Abortion Procedure Ban, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 19, 2007. 
4 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
5 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of 
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decision as ―the most monumental win on the abortion issue that 
we have ever had.‖6 Many supporters of abortion rights saw the 
decision as equally momentous. The Court‘s willingness to uphold 
the federal ban on ―partial birth‖ abortions, having effectively 
wiped thirty similar state laws off the books just seven years earlier 
in Stenberg v. Carhart,
7
 was certainly striking. Leroy Carhart, the 
Nebraska physician who had now twice given his name to 
Supreme Court landmarks, warned that the decision appeared to 
―open[] the door to an all-out assault‖ on Roe.8 The four dissenters 
agreed, lamenting that ―[t]he Court‘s hostility to the [abortion] 
right . . . is not concealed.‖9 
The initial assessments may have exaggerated Carhart‘s 
immediate impact on abortion; because the method of abortion 
proscribed by the federal Act was exceedingly rare to begin with, 
the practical consequences for doctors and patients have been 
limited.
10
 Yet, quite apart from Carhart‘s implications for Roe, the 
decision has provoked puzzlement over what it might mean for the 
future of constitutional privacy and substantive due process more 
generally. Carhart was not only the Roberts Court‘s first abortion 
case, after all, but also its first significant encounter with 
unenumerated rights under substantive due process—including 
what John Roberts, before his nomination, had called ―the so-
called ‗right to privacy.‘‖11 As much as the Court‘s about-face 
                                                        
Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 519, 567 (2007) 
(observing that ―[m]ost commentators agreed that Gonzales took a large step in 
the direction of eventually overturning Roe‖). 
6 Sherman, supra note 3 (quoting Jay Sekulow, chief counsel of American 
Center for Law and Justice). 
7 530 U.S. 914 (2003) (striking down Nebraska statute banning ―partial 
birth abortion[s]‖); see id. at 977, 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
Court‘s judgment effectively invalidated similar laws in thirty states). 
8 Sherman, supra note 3 (quoting Dr. Leroy Carhart). 
9 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
10 David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future 
of Abortion Law, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 45 (concluding that ―Gonzales v. 
Carhart has changed the law, politics, and medicine of abortion far less than 
most early observers hastily thought‖); see also Pushaw, supra note 5, at 567–72 
(emphasizing narrowness of Carhart‘s holding). 
11 Adam Liptak, Privacy Views: Roberts Argued Hard for Others, N.Y. 
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from Stenberg, some observers focused on the jarring difference in 
tone and outcome from the Court‘s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas.
12
  
Lawrence had seemed to signal a newly expansive approach to 
substantive due process in the course of striking down a criminal 
prohibition against same-sex intimacy. Justice Kennedy‘s rhetoric 
for the Court had soared in denouncing the government‘s 
encroachment on the ―‗personal dignity and autonomy‘‖ of gays 
and lesbians.
13
 Four years later in Carhart, human dignity again 
featured in Justice Kennedy‘s analysis but this time as a 
justification for state intervention limiting personal choice. ―The 
Act,‖ Kennedy wrote for the Court in sustaining the federal law, 
―expresses respect for the dignity of human life.‖14 The dignity 
interests of women confronted with an unwanted pregnancy went 
largely unacknowledged; instead, as family law scholars Joanna 
Grossman and Linda McClain observed, ―[a]bortions seem[ed] 
only, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, to involve the ‗abortion 
doctor,‘ ‗the fetus,‘ and ‗the cervix.‘‖15 
The juxtaposition of Kennedy‘s opinions in Lawrence and 
Carhart left some Court-watchers scratching their heads. Linda 
Greenhouse, the New York Times‘ veteran Supreme Court reporter, 
found it ―hard to reconcile [Kennedy‘s] capacious understanding of 
the human condition in [Lawrence] . . . with the patronizing and 
counter-factual attitude toward women that suffuses his majority 
opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart.‖16 Rich Lowry, editor of the 
National Review, was even more blunt. He accused Kennedy, the 
                                                        
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, at A1. 
12 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
13 Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
14 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633. 
15 Joanna Grossman & Linda McClain, Gonzales v. Carhart: How the 
Supreme Court’s Validation of the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
Affects Women’s Constitutional Liberty and Equality, FINDLAW, May 7, 2007, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20070507_mcclain.html (last visited 
July 31, 2008). 
16 Talk to the Newsroom: Supreme Court Reporter, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2008/07/business/media/14askthetimes.html. 
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new pivot man on the Roberts Court, of ―making it up as he goes 
along.‖17 
Still others have seen in Carhart not meandering, but a 
deliberate and fateful jurisprudential turn. Professor Steven 
Calabresi reads Carhart to mark a pointed retreat from Lawrence. 
―Justice Kennedy‘s narrow, restrained approach to substantive due 
process in Gonzales v. Carhart, the blockbuster partial birth 
abortion case decided this past term,‖ he writes, ―shows that he and 
four other Justices have recommitted themselves to the narrow, 
restrained approach of Glucksberg in substantive due process 
cases.‖18 After Carhart, Calabresi concludes, ―Lawrence is void 
for vagueness.‖19 
This Article considers Carhart‘s implications for future 
constitutional protection of unenumerated rights under the 
Constitution. There is no doubting that Kennedy‘s opinion in 
Carhart sounds a very different theme from his work in Lawrence. 
In fact, as I explain more fully below, in some ways it might well 
be fair to describe Carhart as a sort of ―Anti-Lawrence.‖ Yet, for 
all the differences in tone and focus, it appears that Carhart 
ultimately does not so much reject Lawrence as highlight an 
implicit weakness in its approach to protecting privacy rights. 
Carhart, after all, ultimately upholds the ban on ―partial-birth 
abortions‖ not by denying that abortion is a constitutional right, but 
by finding the state‘s imposition on that right to be reasonable. 
Lawrence had left the door open to just such limitations when it 
carefully carved out the question of marriage and other state laws 
conferring ―formal recognition‖ on same-sex families.20 In this 
sense, Carhart may provide a road map for further restrictions of 
constitutional liberties relating to family and intimate association 
                                                        
17 Rich Lowry, America’s Worst Justice, NAT‘L REVIEW ONLINE, July 1, 
2008, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q= NDZhYmJkOWU1OWNiNTRlND 
VmYTVhMGViYzUxYzczY2M=. 
18 Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2008) (referring to Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702 (1997)). 
19 Id. 
20 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); id. at 585 (O‘Connor, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
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that might be found to be consistent with Lawrence. Instead of 
centering the fight on a threshold characterization of the liberty 
interest at stake as fundamental, Carhart shifts the weight of 
analysis to an outright balancing of state and private interests, 
ultimately guided by crucial facts supplied by the legislature. By 
this account, Lawrence and Carhart together suggest that future 
battles over the scope of constitutional protection for individual 
and family privacy will focus less on the boundaries of history and 
tradition, as Professor Calabresi supposes, and more on disputed 
questions of contemporary fact. 
Part I of this Article sets the stage for Carhart by describing 
earlier developments in the Supreme Court‘s approaches to 
abortion and other family privacy rights. In 1992, the Court had 
differentiated abortion from other fundamental rights and assigned 
it a more qualified form of protection under the ―undue burden‖ 
test. Yet subsequent decisions in 2000—including one that 
emerged from the Court‘s first meeting with Dr. Carhart—seemed 
to bring both lines of doctrine back toward common ground. Part II 
contends that Lawrence v. Texas appeared to confirm the new 
approach, defining the boundaries of substantive due process 
loosely in order to extend privacy protection more broadly, while 
providing the protected interests with a muddled form of 
intermediate scrutiny. 
In Part III, I turn to the Court‘s opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, 
acknowledging the ways in which Carhart might accurately be 
described as Lawrence‘s ―polar opposite.‖21 Indeed, the contrasts 
between the decisions are strong enough that it is tempting to 
conclude that one of them must be an outlier. Yet, in Part IV, I 
suggest that both ultimately share a common inclination to resolve 
substantive due process disputes based on a relatively fluid 
balancing of competing private and public interests, while avoiding 
more categorical doctrinal solutions. In addition, Carhart‘s 
readiness to defer to legislative fact-finding in striking that balance 
suggests that the focus of future court battles over same-sex 
marriage, adoption, and similar controversies is likely to be less on 
the bounds of ―deeply rooted‖ tradition and history and more on 
                                                        
21 Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1521. 
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contemporary empirical claims about child welfare and family 
policy. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF MUDDLED SCRUTINY IN ABORTION AND 
FAMILY PRIVACY 
By conventional understanding, fundamental rights under the 
Constitution are given maximum protection by the courts through 
the framework of strict scrutiny. This means that any substantial 
government burden on such a right is presumed to be 
unconstitutional, salvageable only if the state can prove that the 
burden is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling public interest. 
The right of marital privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut 
had been described as fundamental in this sense,
22
 as had the right 
to abortion in Roe v. Wade.
23
 And so strict scrutiny was commonly 
said to govern restrictions on abortion as well as on marriage, 
contraception, childrearing, and the other family-related privacy 
rights recognized by the Supreme Court.
24
 
In reality, close observation revealed that the Court‘s review 
often strayed from this formal description. By the late 1980s, for 
example, it was clear that the Court had relaxed its scrutiny of 
abortion regulations. Rather than rigidly insisting upon 
―compelling interests‖ and ―narrow tailoring,‖ the Court essentially 
passed upon the ―reasonableness‖ of individual regulations from 
case to case.
25
 Something similar could be seen in the Court‘s 
cases dealing with other family-related liberties. Even when the 
Court squarely found burdens on fundamental rights to marry or to 
share a home with one‘s extended family, for example, the Justices 
sometimes muddied the waters in describing their scrutiny of the 
proffered state interests.
26
 Nevertheless, constitutional protection 
                                                        
22 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
23 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
24 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 14.3 689 (7th ed. 2000). 
25 See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate: 
Judicial Experience with the 1980’s “Reasonableness” Test, 76 VA. L. REV. 
519, 523 (1990). 
26 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 689–90 (describing the 
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for abortion and for other family privacy rights was treated alike 
and at least nominally described as maximal. 
In 1992, however, this ―Black Letter‖ law was substantially 
rewritten. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, the Court narrowly turned back a frontal attack on the right 
to abortion, and to the surprise of many reaffirmed Roe‘s ―central 
holding.‖27 In doing so, however, the authors of Casey‘s joint 
opinion, at least two of whom had long expressed skepticism about 
Roe‘s validity,28 resolved their misgivings by giving the abortion 
right a specially qualified status. A woman‘s profoundly personal 
interest in making decisions concerning her pregnancy, Casey 
acknowledged, is of the same character as other fundamental 
―personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
                                                        
Justices‘ descriptions of scrutiny of the proffered state interests); see also David 
D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 537–48 
(2000) (surveying case law and concluding that ―the Court‘s family-privacy 
cases leave considerable doubt about whether strict scrutiny is in fact the 
governing constitutional test‖); Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in 
Fourteenth Amendment “Privacy” Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization 
of Social Issues, 51 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 84 (1988) (observing that in its 
constitutional privacy cases ―the Court often seems to be using standards 
somewhere between the classic rational-basis and compelling-state-interest 
standards‖). 
27 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992); see also Talk to the Newsroom, supra note 16 
(New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse recently called Casey ―[t]he most 
surprising decision‖ during her nearly thirty years covering the Supreme Court.). 
28 In 1989, for example, Justice Kennedy joined Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s 
opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), 
describing Roe in these unflattering terms: 
[T]he rigid Roe framework is hardly consistent with the notion of a 
Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is, and usually speaking in 
general principles, as ours does. The key elements of the Roe 
framework--trimesters and viability--are not found in the text of the 
Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a 
constitutional principle. 
Id. at 518. Justice O‘Connor, too, repeatedly observed that ―Roe‘s trimester 
framework . . . [is] problematic.‖ Id. at 529 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that ―[t]he State has compelling interests in ensuring maternal 
health and in protecting potential human life, and these interests exist 
‗throughout pregnancy‘‖); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O‘Connor, J., dissenting in part). 
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contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education‖—decisions the Court has held belong to a ―‗private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.‘‖29 And, yet, 
―[a]bortion is a unique act,‖ Casey explained.30 Its exercise is 
―fraught with consequences for others,‖ including family members, 
the would-be father, and ―the life or potential life that is aborted.‖31 
The need to balance these weighty interests was said to warrant 
more leeway for state regulation in the context of abortion, and 
therefore a new and softer standard of review. Accordingly, Casey 
jettisoned Roe‘s strict-scrutiny test, with its ―rigid trimester 
framework,‖ in favor of the more flexible ―undue burden‖ 
standard.
32
 Under the new test, government may regulate access to 
abortion before viability, so long as ―its purpose or effect is [not] 
to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion.‖33 After viability, government may go so far as 
prohibiting abortion altogether, ―‗except where it is necessary, in 
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or 
health of the mother.‘‖34   
Of course, some doubted that Casey‘s ratcheting down of the 
strict scrutiny standard normally used to protect fundamental rights 
was driven strictly by the ―uniqueness‖ of abortion. It was also 
eminently plausible to understand the ―undue burden‖ standard as 
a practical compromise of the Court‘s ongoing doubts about 
whether abortion truly qualified as a fundamental constitutional 
right.
35
 The Court might reconcile itself to a debatable extension of 
privacy‘s boundaries by watering down the strength of protection 
afforded.
36
 In any event, for whatever reason, Casey unmistakably 
                                                        
29 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851–53 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
30 Id. at 852. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 878–79. 
33 Id. at 878. 
34 Id. at 879 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973)). 
35 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 65 
(2001); Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 1980, 1981–85 (2002). 
36 Cf. Schneider, supra note 26, at 87 (noting that ―one obvious solution to 
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drove a wedge in privacy doctrine, separating constitutional 
protection of abortion from the nominally full-strength protection 
accorded other fundamental family-related rights.
37
  
Eight years after Casey, however, there was ground for 
reconsidering abortion‘s constitutional ―uniqueness.‖ In 2000, the 
Supreme Court decided two cases just three weeks apart that 
suggested a closer affinity between abortion and other family 
privacy rights. One was Stenberg v. Carhart,
38
 the first ―partial 
birth abortion‖ case. The other was Troxel v. Granville,39 dealing 
with the fundamental child-rearing rights of parents. On one hand, 
Stenberg was notable for the strength of the protection it gave to 
the abortion right, suggesting that Casey‘s undue-burden 
framework was not as weak as some had supposed. On the other 
hand, Troxel suggested that constitutional protection for parental 
rights is not so strong as commonly believed. 
Stenberg presented a challenge to a Nebraska law that 
prohibited ―partial birth abortion.‖ The Nebraska statute defined 
the proscribed act as ―deliberately and intentionally delivering into 
the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, 
for the purpose of performing a procedure [intended to] . . . kill the 
unborn child . . . .‖40 The Act made an exception for such abortions 
when ―necessary to save the life of the mother,‖ but not for those 
necessary to preserve a woman‘s health.41 
A five-member majority struck down the Nebraska statute on 
two independent grounds. First, the statute‘s definition of ―partial 
birth abortion‖ was found to be so broad that it could encompass 
                                                        
the problem of a too-expansive privacy doctrine is to allow the state interests in  
. . . regulation[] to override the privacy right‖). 
37 See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights 
After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 681 (2004) (stating that 
Casey ―altered the very nature of the abortion right, demoting it from a 
fundamental right to something more enigmatic and certainly more fragile‖). 
38 530 U.S. 914 (2000). In this Article, to avoid confusion I refer to 
Stenberg v. Carhart as ―Stenberg,‖ and Gonzales v. Carhart as ―Carhart.‖ 
39 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
40 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921–22 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-
328(1), 28-326(9) (Supp. 1999)). 
41 Id. at 921 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (2007)). 
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not only ―dilation and extraction‖ (D&X) abortions—the method 
that was said to be the target of the law—but also ―dilation and 
evacuation‖ (D&E) abortions, a far more commonly used method. 
Since the law effectively foreclosed the most common method of 
second-trimester abortion, it constituted an ―undue burden‖ on a 
woman‘s right to choose abortion.42 
Second, the statute‘s failure to make an exception for abortions 
necessary to safeguard a woman‘s health was held also sufficient 
to overturn it.
43
 Nebraska defended the law on the ground that a 
woman‘s safety would never require access to the proscribed 
method of abortion, but the Court was unpersuaded.
44
 Justice 
Breyer‘s majority opinion acknowledged that it was uncertain 
whether loss of the D&X method would actually endanger women, 
but held that the medical uncertainty favored leaving women with 
more options. ―[T]he division of medical opinion about the matter 
at most means uncertainty,‖ Breyer wrote, ―a factor that signals the 
presence of risk, not its absence.‖45 
Stenberg‘s invalidation of Nebraska‘s law was, to many 
commentators, surprisingly strong.
46
 The Court did not move 
cautiously, deciding the case on the narrowest possible ground and 
stopping there. Instead, having found the law unconstitutional on 
one ground, the Court proceeded to explore and resolve a second 
potential defect.
47
 Moreover, the Court analyzed the lack of a 
health exception outside the framework of Casey‘s ―undue burden‖ 
test. A health exception was required, the Court held, because the 
record made it plausible to believe that for some women the 
prohibited D&X method would be the safest choice.
48
 This was a 
shift from Casey itself, which, as Caitlin Borgmann has noted, 
                                                        
42 See id. at 938–45. 
43 Id. at 937–38. 
44 Id. at 937. 
45 Id. 
46 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term – Foreword: The 
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 110–13 (2000); David D. 
Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA 
L. REV. 1125, 1155–63 (2001); Pushaw, supra note 5, at 556–59. 
47 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938. 
48 Id. at 936–37. 
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seemed to ―subsume the medical emergency exception within the 
undue burden test rather than treating it as a separate, categorical 
requirement‖ and which ―did not foreclose the possibility that the 
Court would tolerate some unspecified level of risk to a woman‘s 
health.‖49 In Stenberg, the Court felt no need to quantify the 
precise magnitude of the medical risk posed by alternative 
procedures or to weigh that risk against the strength of the state‘s 
interests in proscribing the method.
50
 Instead, the Court‘s opinion 
could be read to suggest that imposition of any health risk on 
women by the state was per se unconstitutional. 
It was this aspect of the Court‘s holding that most provoked 
Justice Kennedy in dissent. Requiring a health exception without 
determining whether the medical risks were significant enough to 
constitute an ―undue burden,‖ he argued, utterly ignored the 
bargain struck in Casey by elevating the woman‘s interests 
categorically above those of the state and others.
51
 The whole point 
of Casey, Kennedy insisted, was that abortion regulations would be 
evaluated by a more fluid balancing of the private and state 
interests at stake; by strictly privileging the woman‘s health 
interests without any balancing, Stenberg had failed ―to accord any 
weight to Nebraska‘s interest in prohibiting partial birth 
abortion.‖52 ―This is an immense constitutional holding,‖ Kennedy 
fumed, and betrayed Casey‘s promise to be ―more solicitous of 
state attempts to vindicate interests related to abortion.‖53 Justice 
Thomas, joined by the remaining dissenters, agreed that the 
Court‘s analysis ―portends a return to an era [of aggressive 
scrutiny] I had thought we had at last abandoned.‖54 
                                                        
49 Borgmann, supra note 37, at 696, 700. 
50 Compare Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914, with Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 
857, 885 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the 
lack of a health exception in Wisconsin‘s and Illinois‘s ―partial birth abortion‖ 
law were unconstitutional because they posed an ―undue burden‖ to women 
seeking late-term abortions), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000). 
51 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 978–79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
54 Id. at 983 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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The rhetoric of the Stenberg dissents may have been excessive, 
but there was little doubt that the majority in Stenberg had indeed 
secured and bolstered constitutional protection for abortion. ―The 
lesson from Stenberg v. Carhart,‖ wrote Professor George Annas 
shortly after the decision was handed down, ―is that the right to 
choose to have an abortion is in no danger from the Court.‖55 The 
―undue burden‖ test was not strict scrutiny, but it wasn‘t a push-
over either; in fact, when it came to the health of women, it did not 
even apply.
56
 
The Court‘s decision in Stenberg came just a few weeks after 
its decision in Troxel v. Granville. Whereas Stenberg involved the 
most contentious ground of constitutional privacy, Troxel involved 
―perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized 
by this Court,‖ and certainly the least controversial: the ―interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children.‖57 In 
Troxel, the Court ruled in favor of the parent, holding that court-
ordered visitation for grandparents over a mother‘s objection 
violated her fundamental rights as a parent. But it did so on 
surprisingly narrow grounds and without applying strict scrutiny. 
Troxel arose from a trial court‘s decision to order regular 
visitation for the paternal grandparents of two girls whose father 
had committed suicide.
58
 The trial court judge acted under a 
Washington statute that authorized courts to order visitation for 
―any person‖ at ―any time‖ a judge thought it beneficial to a 
child.
59
 The Washington Supreme Court held the statute to be 
facially unconstitutional under strict scrutiny, reasoning that the 
state could not impose on a parent‘s judgment concerning 
visitation unless necessary to advance a compelling state interest.
60
 
                                                        
55 George J. Annas, The Shadowlands: The Regulation of Human 
Reproduction in the United States, in CROSS-CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND 
POLICY IN THE US AND ENGLAND 143, 150 (Sanford N. Katz, John Eekelaar & 
Mavis Maclean eds., 2000).  
56 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930–38. 
57 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (O‘Connor, J., plurality 
opinion). 
58 Id. at 60–61. 
59 Id. at 60 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1999)). 
60 See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 27–31 (Wash. 1998), aff’d sub 
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While safeguarding a child from serious harm could qualify as a 
compelling interest, the state court held, merely advancing a 
child‘s ―best interests‖ could not.61 The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve a split in the state courts over the 
constitutionality of grandparent visitation laws, and taking up the 
question in the context of Washington‘s notably free-wheeling 
statute suggested the possibility of a relatively easy resolution. 
But the case turned out to be anything but easy. In the end, the 
Court splintered six ways. There was broad agreement among the 
Justices that court-ordered visitation substantially burdened the 
mother‘s fundamental child-rearing right, but much less consensus 
about what to do about it. Justice O‘Connor‘s plurality opinion 
readily agreed that Washington‘s statute was ―breathtakingly 
broad,‖ and yet was unwilling to follow the Washington Supreme 
Court in holding it facially invalid.
62
 Instead, the plurality was 
prepared to say only that the statute had been unconstitutionally 
applied on the facts of the case. Moreover, in explaining that result, 
the plurality did not use the usual language of ―compelling 
interests‖ and ―narrow tailoring,‖ but held only that the 
Constitution required the state to give ―special weight‖ to a 
parent‘s concerns before overriding her judgments about 
visitation.
63
 The separate opinions of Justices Souter, Stevens, and 
Kennedy, variously concurring and dissenting in the result, applied 
similarly opaque standards.
64
 Indeed, only Justice Thomas, writing 
separately and joined by no other Justice, was left to wonder 
plaintively why strict scrutiny was nowhere to be found in the 
other opinions.
65
 
                                                        
nom. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57. 
61 Smith, 969 P.2d at 30. 
62 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67 (O‘Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
63 See id. at 69–70. 
64 See id. at 75–77 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 85–91 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); id. at 94–101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
65 Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (―The opinions of the plurality, Justice 
Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize such a [fundamental parenting] right, but 
curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would 
apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.‖). 
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Yet, the answer was clear enough. Both the plurality and 
Justices Stevens and Kennedy in dissent cautioned that rigid 
enforcement of parental prerogative carried the risk of 
extinguishing other family relationships of enormous significance. 
This was especially true in light of the growing diversity of 
modern family life.
66
 ―[P]ersons outside the nuclear family,‖ the 
plurality noted, ―are called upon with increasing frequency to assist 
in the everyday tasks of child rearing.‖67 Justice Kennedy worried 
that ―[c]ases are sure to arise – perhaps a substantial number of 
cases – in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a 
significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child 
which is not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto.‖68 
Justice Stevens likewise emphasized that children sometimes 
establish ―family-like bonds‖ with non-parents.69 
The Court in Troxel was not ready to describe these other 
family interests as full-blown fundamental rights, though Justices 
Stevens and Scalia each hinted at that possibility.
70
 But it did not 
need to. It was plain enough that a majority on the Court favored a 
softer, more flexible constitutional standard that would leave room 
for reasonable accommodation of the competing family interests. 
                                                        
66 Id. at 63 (plurality opinion) (observing that ―[t]he demographic changes 
of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family‖). 
67 Id. at 64. 
68 Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
70 See id. (―While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the 
nature of a child‘s liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-
like bonds, it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and 
families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate 
relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their 
interests be balanced in the equation.‖); id. at 92–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(―Judicial vindication of ‗parental rights‘ under a Constitution that does not even 
mention them requires (as Justice Kennedy‘s opinion rightly points out) not only 
a judicially crafted definition of parents, but also – unless, as no one believes, 
the parental rights are to be absolute – judicially approved assessments of ‗harm 
to the child‘ and judicially defined gradations of other persons (grandparents, 
extended family, adoptive family in an adoption later found to be invalid, long-
term guardians, etc.) who may have some claim against the wishes of the 
parents.‖). 
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As Justice Stevens put it, in a statement that captured the main 
concern emphasized as well by both the plurality and Justice 
Kennedy, ―[t]he almost infinite variety of family relationships that 
pervade our ever-changing society strongly counsel against the 
creation by this Court of a constitutional rule that treats a 
biological parent‘s liberty interest in the care and supervision of 
her child as an isolated right that may be exercised arbitrarily.‖71 
The evident solution was to sidestep the rigid presumption of 
individual entitlement underlying strict scrutiny and substitute a 
softer standard that would allow a more fluid balancing of the 
competing interests. 
Professor Carl Schneider, writing a dozen years before Troxel, 
had foreseen that ―one solution to the uncertain dimensions of the 
[privacy] rights of nonstandard rights-bearers would be to 
acknowledge a state interest . . . in protecting the right-bearers (as 
with minors)‖ sufficient to override the privacy rights of traditional 
rights-bearers (such as parents).
72
 At the time, he considered that 
approach to be effectively ―barred by the virtually outcome-
determinative nature of the question whether a fundamental right is 
at stake‖ under conventional strict-scrutiny analysis.73 Yet, by 
departing from strict scrutiny it was possible to expand the 
boundaries of constitutional protection without tying the hands of 
government in addressing the inevitable clashes of private interests 
that would follow.
74
 
It seemed then, after Stenberg and Troxel, that constitutional 
doctrine protecting abortion and other family privacy rights was 
again converging on a common approach.
75
 In both contexts, the 
hard edges of conventional doctrinal categories (e.g., ―fundamental 
rights‖) had been deliberately blurred, and the (nominally) bright-
line directives of tiered scrutiny had been replaced by muddled, 
fact-intensive inquiries that sought to balance more flexibly the 
competing interests from case-to-case. 
                                                        
71 Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
72 Schneider, supra note 26, at 87. 
73 Id. 
74 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of 
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992). 
75 See Meyer, Lochner Redeemed, supra note 46, at 1163. 
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II.  LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE ―MANIFOLD POSSIBILITIES‖ OF 
LIBERTY  
The Supreme Court‘s next major constitutional privacy case, 
Lawrence v. Texas,
76
 followed precisely the tack suggested by 
Troxel, extending the boundaries of substantive due process 
protection while compensating for that generosity by clouding and 
qualifying the strength of the protection afforded. Lawrence drew 
on the line of constitutional privacy cases, from Griswold through 
Casey, to protect the sexual intimacy of gays and lesbians, striking 
down a Texas sodomy law that applied only to same-sex 
partners.
77
 Yet it famously did so without explicitly describing 
their liberty interest as ―fundamental‖ and without applying the 
strict scrutiny normally associated with fundamental rights.
78
 
Justice Kennedy‘s opinion for the Court compounded the 
uncertainty by borrowing from the language of rational-basis 
review, concluding, for example, that Texas‘ sodomy law 
―further[ed] no legitimate interest which can justify its intrusion 
into the personal and private life of the individual.‖79 
But it was obvious that some stronger form of scrutiny was at 
work in Lawrence.  First, although the Court did not label the 
claimants‘ interest a ―fundamental right‖ or a ―privacy right,‖ 
Kennedy labored throughout his majority opinion to connect their 
interest with those protected in past fundamental privacy decisions. 
―[T]he most pertinent beginning point,‖ the Court explained in 
launching its analysis, ―is our decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,‖ which first announced the constitutional right of 
privacy.
80
 From there, Kennedy traced succeeding privacy cases to 
show that constitutional protection had pushed beyond narrow 
boundaries of marriage and the traditional family.
81
 Finally, 
Lawrence quoted Casey‘s statement of the basis for the 
                                                        
76 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
77 See id. at 564–75. 
78 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental 
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004). 
79 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
80 Id. at 564 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
81 See id. at 565–66. 
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Constitution‘s heightened protection of ―personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education‖—a statement savaged 
by Justice Scalia as Casey‘s ―famed sweet-mystery-of-life 
passage‖82—and concluded that ―[p]ersons in a homosexual 
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as 
heterosexual persons do.‖83 This was, in fact, arguably the most 
crucial point of departure between Lawrence and Bowers v. 
Hardwick,
84
 which in 1986 had upheld a Georgia sodomy law 
under rational-basis review. In Bowers, the Court could find ―[n]o 
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one 
hand and homosexual activity on the other‖85; in Lawrence, by 
contrast, the Court saw that same-sex intimacy shares in the same 
essential qualities that define conventional family relationships.
86
 
Second, Kennedy pointedly wrangled with the privacy analysis 
used by the Court in Bowers. In finding no privacy right implicated 
by Georgia‘s sodomy law, Bowers had characterized the privacy 
interest at stake narrowly as one of ―homosexual sodomy.‖87 It 
then denied heightened protection for that interest by limiting the 
scope of constitutional privacy to liberties that could be said to be 
―‗deeply rooted in this Nation‘s history and tradition.‘‖88 Lawrence 
criticized Bowers on both points. 
Bowers‘ narrow description of the private interest, Kennedy 
wrote in Lawrence, ―disclose[d] the Court‘s own failure to 
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.‖89 The Bowers Court 
should have looked beyond the ―particular sex act‖ to see that the 
Texas sodomy law implicated intimate associational interests 
                                                        
82 Id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at 574 (majority opinion). 
84 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
85 Id. at 191. 
86 See David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
453, 454–55 (2004). 
87 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91. 
88 Id. at 191–92 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 
(1977)). 
89 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
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essentially like those protected within conventional families.
90
 ―To 
say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in 
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim,‖ Kennedy wrote, ―just 
as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is 
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.‖91 Having taken 
Bowers to task over its exceedingly narrow framing of the claimed 
fundamental right, the Lawrence opinion went on to criticize 
Bowers‘ focus on ―deeply rooted‖ social consensus as the test for 
validating the claimed right. Kennedy‘s opinion chided Bowers for 
its description of the historical record before then declaring that, in 
any event, ―our laws and traditions in the past half century are of 
most relevance.‖92 More recent developments, Lawrence 
contended, showed ―an emerging awareness‖ that the state has no 
business telling consenting adults how to run their sex lives.
93
 For 
Lawrence, this modern consensus amply validated the 
substantiality of the claimed liberty interest. 
Given the weight of the private interests at stake, it was not 
enough for the state simply to invoke ―respect for the traditional 
family‖ or popular morality.94 ―The issue is whether the majority 
may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole 
society through operation of the criminal law.‖95 Lawrence 
answered no. Justice Kennedy closed the Court‘s opinion with a 
ringing affirmation of the importance of flexibility in interpreting 
the protection afforded by substantive due process: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known 
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they 
might have been more specific. They did not presume to 
have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain 
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the 
                                                        
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 571–72. 
93 Id. at 572. 
94 Id. at 571. 
95 Id. 
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Constitution endures, persons in every generation can 
invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.
96
 
To many, Lawrence signaled an important shift in the Court‘s 
approach to substantive due process.
97
 As Professor Nan Hunter 
observed, by ―extending meaningful constitutional protection to 
liberty interests without denominating them as fundamental 
rights,‖ Lawrence was able to sidestep the usual ―containment 
devices‖ on the Court‘s role, including the insistence that non-
textual rights be ―deeply rooted‖ in history and tradition.98 In 
substitution, Lawrence offered the prospect of broader, though 
more indeterminate, constitutional protection by ―combining the 
inquiry into whether the government‘s justification was reasonable 
with consideration of the nature and the weight of the individual 
interests asserted.‖99 
It was precisely this implication that sent Justice Scalia into 
such urgent damage-control in dissent. Lawrence, he insisted, did 
not redefine substantive due process or recognize a fundamental 
right; it was simply an aberration, a run-away rational-basis case 
that would ultimately, he hoped, be confined to its facts.
100
 By 
casting Lawrence in this way, Scalia hoped to limit future use of 
the decision as precedent for recognizing other fundamental rights. 
To have recognized Lawrence as premised upon constitutional 
privacy would have meant acknowledging the double-barreled 
damage it did to the doctrinal containment devices Scalia and like-
                                                        
96 Id. at 578–79. 
97 See Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: 
Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1184, 1187–88 (2004); Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian 
Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21 (2003); Matthew 
Coles, Lawrence v. Texas and the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16 
STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 23, 26 (2005); Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of 
Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 64 (2006); Nan D. Hunter, Living 
with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2004); Tribe, supra note 78, at 
1899–1900. 
98 Hunter, supra note 97, at 1104, 1119. 
99 Id. at 1122. 
100 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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minded privacy skeptics had labored hard to construct in past 
cases. Of course, designating Lawrence as a rational-basis case 
meant that its implications were potentially even broader.
101
 But 
Scalia was likely prepared to gamble that its robust brand of 
scrutiny would quickly prove unsustainable if applied generally to 
rank-and-file liberty interests. 
For the most part, Justice Scalia‘s gamble appears to be paying 
off. In the years since Lawrence was decided, most lower federal 
and state courts have concluded that ―[d]espite its use of seemingly 
sweeping language, the holding in Lawrence is actually quite 
narrow.‖102 Decisions have emphasized limiting principles 
suggested in Lawrence‘s majority opinion—distinguishing claims 
of association involving commercial exchange, public settings, or 
minors, for instance—to blunt its application.103 In particular, most 
courts have not read Lawrence as displacing the narrower approach 
to substantive due process suggested in Washington v. 
Glucksberg.
104
 As a panel of the D.C. Circuit observed in 2006, 
most federal circuits ―have either treated the Glucksberg analysis 
as controlling after Lawrence, or viewed Lawrence as not, properly 
speaking, a substantive due process decision.‖105 A number of 
                                                        
101 Randy Barnett, for example, reads Lawrence as extending its more 
substantive form of scrutiny to all government restrictions of individual liberty, 
disregarding distinctions between ―fundamental‖ and ―non-fundamental‖ 
liberties. See Barnett, supra note 97, at 35–36. 
102 State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 742 (Utah 2006). 
103 See, e.g., United States v. Palfrey, 499 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(distinguishing Lawrence in case involving prostitution); State v. Senters, 699 
N.W.2d 810, 815–16 (Neb. 2005) (distinguishing Lawrence in case involving 
conduct with a 17-year-old minor); State v. Lowe, 861 N.E.2d 512, 516–17 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (distinguishing Lawrence in case involving conduct 
between consenting adult family members); Singson v. Commonwealth, 621 
S.E.2d 682 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing Lawrence in case involving 
public conduct). 
104 See, e.g., Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 
2008); Williams v. Att‘y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235–37 (11th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 
999–1000 (Wash. 2006); see also Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1527–28; Brian 
Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since 
Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2006). 
105 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von 
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lower courts have cited Justice Scalia‘s dissent to justify their 
conclusion that Lawrence is, at the end of the day, a quirky 
rational-basis case that can be safely set aside and ignored.
106
 
That outcome is attractive for judges who are hostile to 
Lawrence‘s direction or wary of departing from older precedent 
without more explicit marching orders from the Supreme Court. 
But it cannot easily be squared with Lawrence itself. A faithful 
reading of Justice Kennedy‘s majority opinion makes clear that 
Lawrence strayed well beyond rational basis review. After all, if 
Lawrence agreed with Bowers that no fundamental right was 
presented, and disagreed only about the availability of a rational 
basis for the state‘s policy, there would have been no reason for the 
extended refutation of Bowers‘ approach to framing and validating 
fundamental rights. Similarly, the only way to make sense of the 
Lawrence Court‘s strenuous effort to align its own holding with 
those of earlier Courts in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Casey is to 
understand Lawrence as recognizing a liberty interest of similar 
quality.  
Scalia himself anticipated that Lawrence, if applied faithfully, 
offered a model for scrutinizing tradition and morality in family 
law more broadly.
107
 And, while Lawrence has not radically 
reshaped family law on a broad scale, some courts have notably 
drawn on the decision to subject traditional family law measures to 
                                                        
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 476 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted), vacated 
on reh’g en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). The Abigail Alliance 
panel also asserted flatly that ―[n]o court has regarded Lawrence as cabining 
Glucksberg.‖ Id. There is, however, some authority using Lawrence to cabin 
Glucksberg. See, e.g., McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 21, 2008) (concluding that Lawrence appears to modify Glucksberg‘s 
approach by focusing attention on more recent historical support for a claimed 
fundamental right).  
106 See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 818 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 988 (2005); Lofton v. Sec‘y of Dep‘t of Children & Fam. Servs., 358 
F.3d 804, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005); Cook v. 
Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 394–95 (D. Mass. 2006); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. 
Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2005); State v. Fischer, __ P.3d __, 2008 WL 
2971520 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008).  
107 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604–05 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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more searching review. A few judges, for example, have relied on 
Lawrence to find constitutional defects with traditional laws 
regulating polygamy and incest.
108
 More famously, the Supreme 
Courts of California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts each cited 
Lawrence in finding a right to same-sex marriage under the 
constitutions of those states.
109
 Indeed, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court‘s decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health seemed to find inspiration not only in Lawrence‘s bottom-
line but also in its tactic of strategic avoidance. There was no need 
to decide whether gays and lesbians have a ―fundamental right‖ to 
marry, the Massachusetts court insisted, because the state could not 
justify its law even under rational-basis review.
110
 While 
Goodridge held that the state‘s policy of withholding marriage 
                                                        
108 See State v. John M., 894 A.2d 376 (Conn. Ct. App. 2006) (relying on 
Lawrence to hold incest law unconstitutional), review granted, 899 A.2d 622 
(Conn. 2006); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 776–78 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., 
dissenting in part) (arguing that Lawrence forbids criminalizing practice of 
plural ―celestial‖ marriage as bigamy). But see, e.g., Bronson v. Swensen, 394 F. 
Supp. 2d 1329 (D. Utah 2005) (upholding constitutionality of bar on polygamy 
as applied to consenting adults), vacated on other grounds, 500 F.3d 1099 (10th 
Cir. 2007); People v. Scott, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 592, 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(upholding incest law as applied to consenting adults); State v. Lowe, 861 
N.E.2d 512 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (same); Holm, 137 P.3d at 741–49 (upholding 
bigamy law against challenge after Lawrence).  For critical examination of the 
modern rationales for polygamy and incest laws after Lawrence, see Eugene 
Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155 
(2005) (polygamy); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory 
Monogamy and Polyamorous Experience, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
277 (2004) (same); Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope 
Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary 
Family Law Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. L. REV. 1543 (2005) 
(incest); Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN‘S L.J. 337 
(2004) (same).  
109 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451 (Cal. 2008) (citing Lawrence‘s 
understanding of the ―expansive and protective provisions of our constitutions‖ 
in construing the California constitution to protect same-sex marriage); Kerrigan 
v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 467 (Conn. 2008) (concluding 
that ―Lawrence represents a sea change in United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence concerning the rights of gay persons‖); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003). 
110 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961. 
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from same-sex couples was irrational, it was plain that the court‘s 
form of rational-basis review had more than the usual bite.
111
 
Goodridge, like Lawrence, weaved together considerations of both 
equal protection and substantive liberty to find that gays and 
lesbians have a constitutional right to marry, while nominally 
sidestepping the need to specify the exact metes and bounds of 
―fundamental‖ privacy rights.112 Thus, although most courts have 
not been eager to embrace Lawrence‘s broader implications, a 
small but significant number have shown how the decision can be 
used to rethink family law from the ground up. 
III.  GONZALES V. CARHART: THE ANTI-LAWRENCE? 
In 2007, the Supreme Court handed down Gonzales v. 
Carhart,
113
 seeming to mark another turn in substantive due 
process. Three years after Stenberg had struck Nebraska‘s law 
against ―partial birth abortion,‖ Congress enacted the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Act of 2003. Twice before, President Clinton had vetoed 
similar measures.
114
 Now, with a new Administration in the White 
                                                        
111 Professor Lawrence Friedman has observed that Goodridge‘s 
application of a more aggressive form of rational-basis review was consistent 
with past decisions of the Massachusetts court applying the guarantees of the 
state constitution. ―In fact,‖ Friedman writes, ―the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court has long applied at least two kinds of rational basis scrutiny to 
government action: ordinary, deferential rational basis scrutiny in the mine run 
of cases, and an enhanced rational basis scrutiny when the government action in 
question implicates or restricts certain important personal interests.‖ Lawrence 
Friedman, Ordinary and Enhanced Rational Basis Review in the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court: A Preliminary Investigation, 69 ALB. L. REV. 415, 416 
(2006). 
112 In emphasizing the propriety of blending together equality and liberty 
concerns in scrutinizing traditional marriage laws, Goodridge drew directly 
upon Lawrence. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953 (asserting that ―[i]n matters 
implicating marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children, the two 
constitutional concepts frequently overlap, as they do here‖ (citing Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 575)). 
113 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
114 GEORGE ANNAS, AMERICAN BIOETHICS: CROSSING HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
HEALTH LAW BOUNDARIES 123–26 (2005); Garrow, supra note 10, at 3–5 
(reviewing legislative history of congressional enactments).  
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House and with opponents of abortion rights energized by the fight 
in Stenberg, Congress was ready to try again.
115
 The Act so closely 
paralleled the Nebraska law invalidated in Stenberg that it 
amounted to an open declaration of defiance to the Court, or at 
least an invitation to reconsider its decision.
116
 In a signing 
ceremony surrounded by nine congressional supporters of the 
legislation (all middle-aged or elderly white men, as George Annas 
points out
117
), President Bush exhibited the same fighting spirit. 
Opponents of abortion would be undeterred by court rulings, he 
made clear, and would ultimately prevail on ―the facts.‖118 ―The 
facts about partial birth abortion are troubling and tragic,‖ Bush 
declared to applause, ―and no lawyer‘s brief can make them seem 
otherwise.‖119 
The language of the new federal Act was somewhat more 
specific than the Nebraska statute in describing the proscribed 
procedure. Whereas the Nebraska law had prohibited physicians 
from delivering ―a substantial portion‖ of a fetus into the vagina 
before effecting fetal demise, the new federal law went farther in 
specifying what sort of partial delivery would expose a doctor to 
liability. The Act, like the Nebraska law, contained no exception 
for a woman‘s health, though the legislative record made findings 
that ―the prohibited procedure is never medically necessary.‖120 In 
addition to the relatively modest drafting differences between the 
                                                        
115 See RICHARD A. GLENN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 112 (2003) (noting that ―[a]lthough Stenberg 
appeared to be a victory for abortion-rights advocates, it certainly energized 
antiabortion activists, who were encouraged by the closeness of the vote and the 
public‘s perception of partial-birth abortion as a particularly gruesome 
procedure‖). 
116 See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1643 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting 
that ―[t]he Act‘s sponsors left no doubt that their intention was to nullify our 
ruling in Stenberg‖). 
117 ANNAS, AMERICAN BIOETHICS, supra note 114, at 133. 
118 Press Release, White House, President Bush Signs Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (Nov. 5, 2003) (transcript of signing ceremony), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031105-
1.html (last visited July 28, 2008). 
119 Id. 
120 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. 
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Nebraska and federal statutes, there was, of course, another 
important intervening development: the membership of the 
Supreme Court had changed. Since Stenberg, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist had died and Justice O‘Connor had retired, replaced by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.  
In Gonzales v. Carhart, with the new make-up of the Court, 
Justice Kennedy now wrote for a five-member majority in 
upholding the federal Act. Not surprisingly, given the close 
similarity between the federal statute and the earlier Nebraska law, 
the litigation was largely a reprise of the constitutional challenge in 
Stenberg, but now both issues that had proved fatal to the Nebraska 
law were resolved in favor of the federal statute. Carhart did not 
overrule Stenberg, but claimed to distinguish it on the facts. The 
federal law avoided Stenberg‘s overbreadth concern by adding an 
overt-act requirement and by specifying ―anatomical landmarks to 
which the fetus must be partially delivered‖ to incur criminal 
liability.
121
 In sustaining the federal law‘s omission of a health 
exception, Kennedy‘s majority opinion adopted the position he had 
argued for in his Stenberg dissent. First, the need for a health 
exception was analyzed through, not apart from, the undue-burden 
test.
122
 Second, and relatedly, Kennedy made clear that the decisive 
question was not—as it appeared to be for the majority in 
Stenberg—whether the prohibited D&X procedure was, for some 
women, the safest option.
123
 Instead, under Carhart, the decisive 
question was whether any health risks imposed on women by the 
Act were sufficiently ―significant‖ to outweigh the state‘s interests 
in prohibiting the D&X method.
124
 Legislatures are entitled to 
                                                        
121 Id. at 1630. 
122 See id. at 1635. 
123 Compare, e.g., id. (emphasizing evidence that remaining methods offer 
a ―safe‖ alternative to the proscribed method), with Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937 
(emphasizing evidence that the proscribed method is, for some women, a ―safer‖ 
method). 
124 See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1635–38. At oral argument, Priscilla Smith 
and Eve Gartner, counsel for respondents challenging the constitutionality of the 
federal Act, had each conceded that proof that D&X offered merely ―marginal‖ 
safety advantages for women would not be enough to invalidate the Act; but 
they both insisted that D&X, in fact, offered some women significant safety 
benefits. See Garrow, supra note 10, at 17–18 (reviewing colloquies at oral 
MEYER 4/27/2009  7:12 PM 
82 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
strike their own ―balance of risks,‖ Kennedy suggested, so long as 
they leave available to women abortion options that are recognized 
to be ―safe,‖ even if not necessarily the safest.125 ―[I]f some 
procedures have different risks than others,‖ Kennedy wrote, ―it 
does not follow that the State is altogether barred from imposing 
reasonable regulations.‖126 
In passing on the reasonableness of Congress‘ decision to 
eliminate the D&X option, Carhart balanced the apparent 
magnitude of the risks to women against the strength of the state‘s 
regulatory interests. On both questions, Justice Kennedy‘s opinion 
presented itself as heavily driven by the facts. In assessing the risks 
to women, the Court deferred to congressional fact-finding 
suggesting that forgoing the D&X option presented no significant 
health risks. Kennedy hastened to add that the Court ―retain[ed] an 
independent duty to review factual findings where constitutional 
rights are at stake,‖ but insisted that ―a deferential standard‖ was 
appropriate.
127
 True, some of Congress‘ findings were ―factually 
incorrect,‖ but the record did not refute its ultimate judgment that 
women would continue to have adequately ―safe‖ abortion options 
even after the prohibition of D&X.
128
 And, significantly, the Court 
held that Congress was entitled to legislate based upon its own 
rational judgments in the face of medical uncertainty about the 
relevant risks.
129
 
Similarly, in assessing the strengths of the state‘s interests in 
prohibiting the D&X method, Carhart focused on what it 
presented as the facts. In the majority opinion, Kennedy focused 
first on the facts of the medical procedure itself, insisting that 
simply describing ―the prohibited abortion procedure demonstrates 
                                                        
argument). 
125 See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. The Carhart majority added that a 
woman could still challenge the application of the Act to her on the ground that 
it endangered her health, but insisted that ―[i]n an as-applied challenge the 
nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced than in a facial 
attack.‖ Id. at 1638–39. 
126 Id. at 1638. 
127 Id. at 1637. 
128 Id. at 1637–38. 
129 See id. at 1638. 
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the rationale for the congressional enactment.‖130 The Act, 
Kennedy wrote, advanced several ―legitimate‖ state interests, 
including expressing ―respect for the dignity of human life,‖ 
safeguarding public respect for the medical profession, addressing 
―ethical and moral concerns‖ relating to the ―‗disturbing 
similarity‘‖ between D&X abortions and infanticide, and 
protecting women from future regret and distress over having 
chosen the procedure.
131
 The factual record on these points was 
generally thin, but the Court plainly found the underlying 
assumptions to be reasonable. For example, the Court wrote that 
―[w]hile we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it 
seems unexceptionable to conclude that some women come to 
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and 
sustained.‖132 It was ―self-evident‖ that a woman who later regrets 
an abortion would have her grief compounded by knowing that she 
had undergone the D&X procedure.
133
 It was ―reasonable for 
Congress to think,‖ the Court wrote, that public respect for the 
medical profession might be eroded more sharply by tolerance of 
D&X than D&E abortions.
134
 
In assessing both the medical risks for women and the strength 
of the state‘s interests, Carhart deferred to legislative factual 
determinations that the Court considered reasonable, even when 
record evidence to support those judgments was thin, unavailable, 
or effectively in equipoise. The Court underscored the deferential 
nature of its review by infusing its opinion with the language of 
rational-basis review. ―[W]e must determine whether the Act 
furthers the legitimate interest of the Government,‖ the opinion 
stated at one point; ―[w]here it has a rational basis to act, and it 
does not impose an undue burden,‖ the opinion later stated, ―the 
State may use its regulatory power . . . , all in furtherance of its 
legitimate interests . . . .‖135 
                                                        
130 Id. at 1632. 
131 Id. at 1633–34. 
132 Id. at 1634 (citing an amicus curiae brief quoting the testimony of some 
women who expressed regret over past abortions). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1635. 
135 Id. at 1626, 1633; see also id. at 1638 (―Considerations of marginal 
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Carhart seemed to pull back so hard from the Court‘s earlier 
decisions in Stenberg and Lawrence that observers from diverse 
perspectives were left to wonder whether the Roberts Court had 
taken a dramatic turn not only on abortion rights but on substantive 
due process more broadly. Indeed, in many respects, Carhart 
seemed to depart so clearly from the approach suggested in 
Lawrence that it might be seen as a sort of Anti-Lawrence: 
• Lawrence had suggested the need for special sensitivity in 
reviewing the use of criminal sanctions to control intimate 
personal decisions.
136
 The Lawrence Court, for example, 
had queried whether the state could enforce majoritarian 
sensibilities about sexuality and family life ―through the 
operation of the criminal law,‖137 and expressed special 
concern with the stigma, disabilities, and ―collateral 
consequences‖ associated with criminal sanctions.138 In 
Carhart, by contrast, the Court had no apparent qualms in 
upholding a federal criminal statute that threatened to send 
physicians to prison for up to two years.
139
 
• Lawrence had centered constitutional protection on vital 
relational interests, pointedly tying individual decisions 
about sex to the construction of family life and the 
development of enduring ―personal bond[s].‖140 Carhart, 
                                                        
safety, including the balance of risks, are within the legislative competence 
when the regulation is rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends.‖). 
136 See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, 
Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 70–71 (2003) 
(suggesting that Lawrence might be read to specially ―forbid[] the state from 
using the heavy artillery of the criminal law‖). 
137 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003); see also id. at 567 (―The 
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to 
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without 
being punished as criminals.‖). 
138 Id. at 575–76 (underscoring concern with ―the consequential nature of 
the punishment and the state-sponsored condemnation attendant to the criminal 
prohibition‖). 
139 See 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2007). 
140 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; see Meyer, supra note 86, at 18; see also 
Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term – Foreword: Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 97 (2003) 
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by contrast, completed the shift of the locus for protection 
of abortion from the doctor-patient relation (where it began 
in Roe) to the individual privacy interest of the pregnant 
woman alone, stripping away any vestiges of constitutional 
protection for the doctor‘s independent professional 
judgment and discretion.
141
 
• Lawrence had drawn powerfully on equality principles to 
heighten its due process scrutiny of Texas‘ sodomy law, 
recognizing that ―[e]quality of treatment and the due 
process right to demand respect for conduct protected by 
the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important 
respects.‖142 Indeed, its entwining of ―substantive due 
process and equal protection doctrine into a holistic 
analysis of the cultural weight of the individual rights 
involved‖ had struck many observers as Lawrence‘s most 
salient feature, even if, as Kenneth Karst has shown, the 
phenomenon was not unprecedented.
143
 By contrast, 
Carhart pointedly ignored the equality implications of its 
understanding of women‘s substantive liberties; indeed, 
Kennedy‘s balancing of interests was focused, as Professor 
Calabresi noted, on ―the state‘s interest in fetal life with no 
further attention to—or discussion whatsoever of—a 
woman‘s liberty interest in procuring abortion.‖144 Instead, 
                                                        
(noting that Lawrence‘s ―legal and rhetorical energy seems directed . . . at a 
concern for the dignity of enduring intimate relationships and a refusal to permit 
‗stigma‘ to be imposed because of those relationships‖). 
141 For an insightful account of the role of the doctor-patient relationship in 
Roe‘s protection of abortion, see Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, 
and the Myth of Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147 (2006); see also 
Peter M. Ladwein, Note, Discerning the Meaning of Gonzales v. Carhart: The 
End of the Physician Veto and the Resulting Change in Abortion Jurisprudence¸ 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847 (2008). 
142 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
143 Hunter, Living with Lawrence, supra note 97, at 1103; see also Pamela 
S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth 
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473 (2002); Kenneth L. Karst, The 
Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 99 (2007); Post, supra note 140, at 97. 
144 Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1520. 
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it was left to Justice Ginsburg in dissent to emphasize that 
the case was not solely about ―some generalized notion of 
privacy,‖ but also women‘s ―equal citizenship.‖145 
• Lawrence had refused to accept traditional understandings 
of family as a basis for laws against sodomy. Kennedy‘s 
opinion in Lawrence had acknowledged that ―many 
persons‖ favored sodomy laws as a means of advancing 
―profound and deep convictions‖ relating to ―respect for the 
traditional family.‖146 While expressing respect for these 
convictions, Lawrence held that they could not justify 
criminalization of contrary choices.
147
 Carhart, by contrast, 
relied directly on traditional assumptions about maternal 
instinct as a basis for abortion regulation. ―Respect for 
human life,‖ Kennedy wrote in Carhart, ―finds an ultimate 
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her 
child.‖148 The state, Carhart held, was entitled to act to 
protect women from the profound ―grief‖ and ―sorrow‖ that 
would naturally be visited upon those who consented to 
D&X abortions in defiance of that instinctive bond.
149
 
Whereas Lawrence demanded public respect for the dignity 
of those who defied conventional expectations concerning 
                                                        
145 Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (―[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do 
not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a 
woman‘s autonomy to determine her life‘s course, and thus to enjoy equal 
citizenship stature.‖). 
146 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. 
147 See id. 
148 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634; see Helen M. Alvaré, Gonzales v. Carhart: 
Bringing Abortion Law Back into the Family Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409, 
410–11 (2008) (observing that Carhart ―appeared to adopt presumptions about 
parents and unborn children that family law typically applies to relationships 
between parents and their born children,‖ and that ―Gonzales, like many family 
law cases, apparently relied on these presumptions in deference to their claimed 
self-evident nature and in response to the assertions of the involved adults‖). 
149 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. For an account of the growing emphasis on 
―woman-protective‖ rationales for restrictive abortion regulations, see Reva B. 
Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007). 
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gender roles and family organization, Carhart invoked 
those very expectations to justify public control of defiant 
choices.  
• Finally, Lawrence held that government may not rest on 
popular morality to cabin protected family or intimate 
relationships, and instead must offer some demonstrable 
social harm—some ―injury to a person or abuse of an 
institution the law protects.‖150 Carhart, by contrast, readily 
upheld Congress‘ power to proscribe a method of abortion 
based on popular ―ethical and moral concerns‖ likening the 
D&X procedure to infanticide.
151
 True, Carhart went on to 
find additional social harms supporting the legislation—
erosion of public respect for the medical profession and 
emotional distress suffered by regretful women—but these 
were so thinly supported that it is hard to believe a like-
minded Court could not have identified similar harms to 
sustain Texas‘ sodomy law.152 
IV. CHOOSING SIDES: LAWRENCE OR CARHART—OR BOTH? 
The striking contrast between Lawrence and Carhart raises an 
obvious and basic question: Does Carhart signal a general retreat 
from Lawrence‘s expansive conception of personal liberty? Or, 
alternatively, is Carhart‘s seemingly greater tolerance for state 
intervention on personal autonomy limited to abortion? The 
seeming schism between the decisions arguably appears to require 
designating one of them an outlier. That both opinions were 
written by the same author just four years apart makes the puzzle 
all the more intriguing. 
In a recent essay in the Michigan Law Review, Professor 
Calabresi takes the former view. He reads Carhart as signaling 
Justice Kennedy‘s return to the fold of substantive due process 
                                                        
150 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 571. 
151 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633. 
152 See Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1521 (―Clearly, the [Carhart] Court 
takes a different view from the Casey and Lawrence Courts when it comes to 
government enforcement of morals legislation.‖). 
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skeptics after his brief and regrettable adventurism in Lawrence.
153
 
Carhart is ―a pro-judicial restraint, anti-substantive due process 
decision,‖ Calabresi writes, and ―suggests a greatly reduced role 
for the Court in inventing new constitutional rights that is 
dramatically opposed to the expansive language of Casey and 
Lawrence.‖154 Kennedy‘s failure in Carhart to acknowledge 
Lawrence, his slighting of women‘s liberty interests relating to 
abortion, and his preference for as-applied over facial challenges, 
Calabresi argues, each point to a retreat from Lawrence.
155
 After 
five years of uncertainty stirred by Lawrence‘s bold rhetorical 
strokes, Carhart makes clear that Lawrence has not displaced 
Glucksberg as the standard-bearer for modern substantive due 
process analysis, and that Lawrence in fact can be safely relegated 
to the wings, an outlier that has no application beyond its facts.
156
 
―Kennedy‘s opinion in Gonzales seems not to regard courts as the 
arbiters of our liberty,‖ Calabresi writes, ―but as the modest 
adjudicators of very concrete cases and controversies in situations 
where the Court absolutely must rule because the facts force it to 
do so.‖157 
Justice Ginsburg, by contrast, takes the second view suggested 
above, seeing the decision in Carhart as driven chiefly by hostility 
to abortion rights. In closing her dissent, Ginsburg contended that 
the majority‘s decision ―cannot be understood as anything other 
than an effort to chip away‖ at the right recognized in Roe and 
Casey.
158
 Other observers expressed a similar view, fearful—or 
hopeful—that another shoe is yet to drop.159 Certainly, for those 
                                                        
153 See id. at 1520–21. 
154 Id. at 1520. 
155 See id. at 1520–21. 
156 See id. at 1518–21, 1541. 
157 Id. at 1521. 
158 Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1653 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
159 See 2007 NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., ROE V. WADE AND THE 
RIGHT TO CHOOSE 3–4 (2007), available at http://www.naral.org/assets/files 
/Courts-SCOTUS-Roe.pdf (stating that Carhart ―has paved the way for further 
setbacks to reproductive freedom and personal privacy‖ and that ―Roe is in 
peril‖); NAT‘L WOMEN‘S LAW CENTER, GONZALES V. CARHART: THE SUPREME 
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who welcomed Lawrence‘s willingness to protect intimacy and 
family liberty outside the lines of ―deeply rooted‖ social 
convention, it might be tempting to take a page from Justice 
Scalia‘s playbook in Lawrence and try to contain the damage by 
casting Carhart as a rogue decision properly confined to its facts—
once again effectively cleaving substantive due process protection 
for abortion from due process protection for other fundamental 
family liberties.
160
 
I think it would be a mistake to suppose that Carhart does not 
have broader implications for substantive due process and other 
family privacy rights. But I do not agree that it amounts to an 
implicit disavowal of Lawrence and a ratification of Glucksberg‘s 
narrower, history-oriented conception of fundamental rights. In 
fact, rather than seeing Justice Kennedy‘s opinions in Lawrence 
and Carhart as essentially at odds, requiring a choice between 
them, I see them as fundamentally sharing a common premise. 
It seems implausible that Justice Kennedy intends Carhart to 
usher in a reversal of Roe or his own handiwork in Casey. Indeed, 
setting aside its provocative rhetoric, a close reading of Kennedy‘s 
opinion confirms that it actually upheld the Act ―only in the 
narrowest and most carefully circumscribed manner.‖161 Carhart 
sustained the Act against facial constitutional attack, but left open 
the possibility of future as-applied challenges in which ―the nature 
of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced.‖162 What 
Kennedy ultimately wants, then, is to have it both ways—to have 
his right and eat it too, in effect—by way of a compromise in 
                                                        
COURT TURNS ITS BACK ON WOMEN‘S HEALTH AND ON THREE DECADES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5–6 (2007), available at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf 
/GonzalesvCarhart2.pdf. Cf. Carole Joffe, The Abortion Procedure Ban: Bush’s 
Gift to His Base, DISSENT MAG., Fall 2007, available at 
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=941 (―Legal observers on all 
sides of the abortion issue agree that [Carhart] may usher in a massive new 
round of attempted restrictions on abortion.‖). 
160 Cf. supra Part I (recounting bifurcation of family privacy doctrine 
between abortion and other family-related liberties in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey and later implicit convergence of the doctrinal standards). 
161 Garrow, supra note 10, at 47; accord Pushaw, supra note 5, at 526, 
567–68. 
162 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638–39. 
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which the right is retained but subject to ―reasonable‖ state 
limitation. Indeed, this was the emphatic central claim of both 
Kennedy‘s majority opinion in Carhart and his earlier dissent in 
Stenberg—that Casey‘s compromise requires a more even 
weighing of state and private interests in evaluating the 
permissibility of abortion regulations from case to case.
163
 ―Casey, 
in short, struck a balance,‖ Kennedy underscored in Carhart. ―The 
balance was central to its holding.‖164 As Kennedy saw it, Carhart 
in no way ―refuse[d] to take Casey . . . seriously,‖ as Ginsburg 
alleged in dissent.
165
 Instead, in his view, it was Stenberg that had 
refused to take Casey seriously; Carhart merely restored the 
balance.
166
 
A similar sort of balancing was also central to Justice 
Kennedy‘s approach to parental rights in Troxel. In Troxel, 
Kennedy emphasized the importance of construing parents‘ child-
rearing rights flexibly in order to leave room for preserving 
potentially significant family relationships between children and 
non-parent caregivers.
167
 He rejected the Washington Supreme 
Court‘s construction of parents‘ rights, under which parents would 
be constitutionally entitled to block visitation in all cases except 
where doing so would inflict ―harm‖ on a child, as dangerously 
―categorical‖; instead, he argued that the Constitution should be 
read to leave courts with leeway to balance the competing interests 
case-by-case through the flexible ―best interests of the child‖ 
standard.
168
 In a fundamental sense, Carhart can be seen as quite 
consistent with Kennedy‘s instincts in Troxel and Lawrence; in 
each case, Kennedy sought to avoid rigid, categorical 
understandings of constitutional rights that might limit the ability 
                                                        
163 See id. at 1626–27; Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 956–57 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
164 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1627. 
165 Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
166 See Garrow, supra note 10, at 22–27, 45–47 (suggesting that Kennedy‘s 
approach in Carhart appears to be consistent with his own understanding of 
Casey). 
167 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98–99 (2000) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
168 Id. at 96–99. 
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of judges to decide from case to case how best to balance the 
competing private and public interests. 
Calabresi argues that Kennedy‘s position in Troxel supports 
Calabresi‘s thesis that Kennedy is, at heart, a ―restraintist‖ when it 
comes to substantive due process.
169
 Calabresi understands 
Kennedy to have relied on Glucksberg‘s concern with ―history and 
tradition‖ in rejecting a broad construction of parental rights, in 
part out of a ―hesitat[ion] to constitutionalize this area of family 
law.‖170 Yet, this misreads the nature of Kennedy‘s restraint in 
Troxel. Kennedy readily accepted that unwanted visitation orders 
burden parents‘ fundamental childrearing rights and trigger 
constitutional scrutiny; in this sense, he was clearly no skeptic of 
substantive due process protection for parents.
171
 Kennedy‘s point 
was that parents‘ rights should not be construed ―categorical[ly],‖ 
in a manner that would reflexively override children‘s 
countervailing interests in maintaining important relationships with 
others. For Kennedy, the scope of parents‘ constitutional rights 
respecting visitation should not be reduced to a bright-line rule; 
instead, it should be ―elaborated with care‖ from case to case, with 
sensitive regard for the particular circumstances of each family.
172
 
This is a restrained approach to the scope of parental rights, in that 
it pointedly rejects bright-line constitutional entitlements, but it is 
not a restrained approach to substantive due process. Indeed, by 
encouraging courts to define the boundaries of substantive due 
process by balancing the competing relational interests from case 
to case, Kennedy‘s approach seems highly likely to propel the 
further ―constitutionalization‖ of family law.173 
Lawrence can be read in much the same way. After all, for all 
its eloquence, the constitutional protection it gives is emphatically 
qualified. The Court bars criminal penalties on private, consensual, 
adult intimacy, but is careful to set aside whether the intimate 
bonds of gays and lesbians are entitled to formal recognition. The 
                                                        
169 See Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1522, 1528–31. 
170 Id. at 1529–30. 
171 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
172 See id. at 101. 
173 See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. 
L.Q. __ (forthcoming 2008). 
MEYER 4/27/2009  7:12 PM 
92 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Court suggests that altogether different constitutional standards 
would apply to ―public conduct‖ or to intimacy involving 
minors.
174
 Justice O‘Connor, focusing on equal protection in her 
opinion concurring in the judgment, suggested a similar line. She 
agreed that mere ―[m]oral disapproval of a group‖ is not a 
legitimate reason for state discrimination, and so invalidated 
Texas‘ sodomy law, but she was keen to emphasize that this did 
not mean that ―other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals 
and homosexuals would similarly fail.‖175 Specifically, she argued 
that ―other [legitimate] reasons‖ support limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples.
176
 
Justice Scalia castigated both Kennedy and O‘Connor for 
presuming a power to distinguish between morality-based sodomy 
laws and morality-based marriage laws.  There is no way in 
―principle and logic,‖ Scalia wrote, to defend the distinctions 
Lawrence supposes.
177
 ―One of the benefits of leaving regulation 
of this matter to the people rather than to the courts,‖ he observed, 
―is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their 
logical conclusion. The people may feel that their disapprobation 
of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosexual 
marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual 
acts—and may legislate accordingly.‖178 While ―[t]he Court today 
pretends that it possesses a similar freedom of action,‖ he 
concluded, such judgments are quintessentially political and cannot 
be explained as a matter of constitutional principle.
179
 The 
Supreme Courts of California, Connecticut, and Massachusetts 
evidently agree, having cited Lawrence in finding state 
constitutional protection for same-sex marriage. 
                                                        
174 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). For a contrary view 
concerning ―public conduct,‖ see Carlos A. Ball, Privacy, Property, and Public 
Sex (unpublished draft paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1091526. 
175 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583, 585 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
176 Id. at 585. 
177 Id.at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
178 Id. at 604. 
179 Id. 
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Yet I suspect that Justice Kennedy may find in Carhart a 
model for taking up the challenge. Carhart, like Lawrence and 
Troxel, reached an outcome that aligns closely with popular 
sensibilities. As Professor Robert Pushaw observes, ―[w]hatever 
the deficiencies of Justice Kennedy‘s legal analysis, his political 
instincts seem sound . . . . [H]e has roughly articulated the 
mainstream American view: allow women to choose abortion in 
the early period of pregnancy, but recognize the government‘s 
interest in expressing its citizens‘ moral condemnation of partial-
birth abortion.‖180 Kennedy‘s majority opinion justified this result 
not by manipulating the definitional boundaries of the 
constitutional right, but by accepting ―facts‖ demonstrating the 
reasonableness of Congress‘ incursion on the right. 
Carhart upheld the federal Act based on a battery of factual 
claims. The public interests advanced by the law included—
alongside moral objections to the method of abortion—concern for 
protecting public respect for the medical profession and protecting 
women from distress and regret over their choices. The absence of 
a health exception was explained away on the basis of Congress‘ 
findings minimizing (indeed, denying) any health advantages of 
the banned method. The problem, of course, was that each of these 
empirical assumptions was unproven at best. Conjecture about the 
loss of public respect for doctors was deemed ―reasonable.‖ The 
absence of any ―reliable data‖ proving the incidence of post-
abortion regret and distress was of no consequence, because the 
harm to women was ―self-evident.‖ Congress was entitled to 
assume that its action did not expose women to significant health 
risks because the matter was ―uncertain.‖ The Court claimed to 
exercise an ―independent constitutional duty‖ to review legislative 
findings trenching on constitutional rights, but this seemed to 
amount only to ensuring that the factual claims were within the 
realm of reasonable disagreement. So long as the evidence did not 
squarely preclude the legislature‘s assumption, it was free to 
regulate. 
This tolerance of regulation on the basis of uncertain factual 
conjecture provides a route to justifying the line-drawing on family 
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liberties hinted at in Lawrence. Factual claims concerning the 
welfare of children raised by gay and lesbian couples have already 
taken center stage in defenses of state laws banning same-sex 
marriage.
181
 Ever since Hawaii was forced to justify its ban on 
same-sex marriage in Baehr v. Lewin
182
 more than a decade ago, 
states have downplayed moral objections to homosexuality and 
focused on empirical claims that traditional, dual-sex marriage 
provides the optimal setting for procreation and the raising of 
children.
183
 A number of judges hearing these cases have viewed 
―the state of the scientific evidence as unsettled on the critical 
question,‖184 and have concluded, as the New York Court of 
Appeals did in 2006, that ―[i]n the absence of conclusive scientific 
evidence, the Legislature [can] rationally proceed on the common-
sense premise that children will do best with a mother and father in 
the home.‖185 
Of course, if the rational basis test properly governs, such 
deference is unobjectionable. Yet Carhart, with its deference to 
legislative factfinding in the context of medical uncertainty, might 
seem to validate this approach even if a form of intermediate 
scrutiny were thought to apply. If so, a path is cleared for states to 
place ―reasonable‖ limitations on family liberties under 
Lawrence—for instance, decriminalizing adult intimacy while 
denying public recognition in marriage—all on the basis of factual 
claims that, while unproven, strike the court as reasonable.  
This points out an inherent danger of the approach taken in 
Lawrence (and Goodridge), broadening constitutional protection 
                                                        
181 See Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on 
Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORD. L. REV. 2733, 2735 
(2008). 
182 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993). 
183 See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 
3, 1996) (examining state‘s justifications for banning same-sex marriage on 
remand from Hawaii Supreme Court); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 269 (N.J. App. 
Div. 2005), rev’d in part, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 
138 P.3d 963, 1006 (Wash. 2006); William C. Duncan, The State Interests in 
Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153 (2004). 
184 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 980 (Sosman, J., dissenting). 
185 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006). 
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without squarely defining the nature of the private interest at stake 
as ―fundamental‖ and without specifying the nature and strength of 
the constitutional scrutiny it triggers. Under traditional doctrine, 
deference to plausible legislative conjecture was the heart of 
rational-basis review; under heightened scrutiny, government was 
generally required to prove its claims of necessity. The murkiness 
of the ―new‖ substantive due process provides cover for expanding 
protection, but also for importing uncharacteristically deferential 
standards like the one adopted in Carhart. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Pushaw has argued that ―[t]he abortion cases 
illuminate the perils of the modern Court‘s idiosyncratic, 
politicized, common law style of constitutional decision 
making.‖186 Ironically, this is an assessment with which observers 
from different perspectives may well agree. For Pushaw and other 
skeptics of the constitutional abortion right, the see-sawing in the 
partial-birth abortion cases highlights the need to extract the Court 
from the business of supervising legislative judgment in the field 
altogether. For many supporters of abortion rights, the see-sawing 
demonstrates the perilous fragility of constitutional protection 
under the softer ―undue burden‖ framework and the need to 
contain judicial discretion by more heavily privileging the liberty 
interest of pregnant women. What both camps desire is a 
jurisprudence in which the boundaries of permissible state 
regulation of abortion are drawn with brighter lines at the outset, 
and in which outcomes are less dependent upon the vicissitudes of 
ad hoc balancing (and thus the ideological inclinations of the 
particular Justices sitting at the time of argument). 
But approaches that make the initial characterization of 
constitutional rights outcome-determinative have their costs as 
well. In the broader context of family privacy rights, I have 
defended the Court‘s de facto use of a form of intermediate 
constitutional scrutiny on pragmatic grounds.
187
 Rigid application 
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of conventional fundamental-rights analysis is often poorly suited 
to capture the complex interplay of individual interests at stake in 
controversies over the family. The use of full-bodied strict scrutiny 
to protect family privacy rights assumes a unity of family interests 
opposing the state‘s intervention, when in fact family members 
may be divided over their associational ambitions. Too often, the 
felt need to squeeze complicated family conflicts into standard 
doctrinal categories has led courts to deny any heightened 
constitutional protection for non-standard rights-holders, such as 
children, informal caregivers, or same-sex partners.
188
 Against this 
background, the loosening up of traditional constitutional analysis 
in Troxel and Lawrence has for the most part struck me as a 
welcome development. By substituting a less heavy-handed form 
of scrutiny, the Court has been able to recognize and more 
sensitively accommodate a broader range of family interests in our 
increasingly diverse society. 
Carhart is a reminder that the indeterminacy of this approach 
can leave some privacy interests vulnerable to state regulation. 
Lawrence was not a one-sided victory for a broader liberty of 
family life; the flip side of that generosity was the danger that 
newly recognized family rights might be more easily overcome by 
claims of state necessity. The new danger underscored by Carhart 
is that states might not actually be put to persuasive proof of their 
claims, but might be allowed to rest on plausible conjecture in the 
absence of conclusive counterproof. If so, Lawrence and Carhart 
may be chiefly significant for shifting the fight over substantive 
due process to a new ground, one increasingly centered on the 
―reasonableness‖ of the state‘s factual assumptions.  
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